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Since the 1988 amendment of the 10 CFR 50.46 rule in 1988, Westinghouse has been developing and applying realistic or best-
estimate methods to perform LOCA safety analyses. A realistic analysis requires the execution of various realistic LOCA transient
simulations where the eﬀect of both model and input uncertainties are ranged and propagated throughout the transients. The
outcome is typically a range of results with associated probabilities. The thermal/hydraulic code is the engine of the methodology
but a procedure is developed to assess the code and determine its biases and uncertainties. In addition, inputs to the simulation
are also aﬀected by uncertainty and these uncertainties are incorporated into the process. Several approaches have been proposed
and applied in the industry in the framework of best-estimate methods. Most of the implementations, including Westinghouse,
follow the Code Scaling, Applicability and Uncertainty (CSAU) methodology. Westinghouse methodology is based on the use of
the WCOBRA/TRAC thermal-hydraulic code. The paper starts with an overview of the regulations and its interpretation in the
context of realistic analysis. The CSAU roadmap is reviewed in the context of its implementation in the Westinghouse evaluation
model. An overview of the code (WCOBRA/TRAC) and methodology is provided. Finally, the recent evolution to nonparametric
statistics in the current edition of the W methodology is discussed. Sample results of a typical large break LOCA analysis for a
PWR are provided.
Copyright © 2008 Cesare Frepoli. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License,
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
1. INTRODUCTION
The 1988 amendment of the 10 CFR 50.46 rule allowed the
use of realistic physical models to analyze loss-of-coolant ac-
cident (LOCA). Best-estimate LOCA methods are now ex-
tensively employed within the nuclear industry. In particu-
lar, Westinghouse has been developing and applying realistic
or best-estimate LOCA methods for almost two decades now
and a large amount of experience has being gained in this
ﬁeld.
The Westinghouse realistic (best-estimate) methodology
is based on the Code Scaling, Applicability and Uncertainty
(CSAU) methodology (Boyack et al. [1]). The methodology
was approved by the NRC in 1996 after an extensive review.
At that time, this was the ﬁrst best-estimate (BE) LOCA eval-
uation model approved (Bajorek et al. [2], Young et al. [3]).
In its original version W BE methodology was applicable to
3- and 4-loop plants with safety injection into the cold leg.
Subsequently,themethodologyapplicabilitywasextendedto
2-loop plants with upper plenum injection (UPI) in 1999
(Takeuchi et al. [4–6]) and advanced passive plant such as
the AP600 and AP1000 (Frepoli et al. [7]). Since its approval,
Westinghouse has applied the methodology to more than 30
nuclear power plants (Muftuoglu et al. [8], Frepoli et al. [9–
11]) both in the USA and abroad.
Westinghouse LOCA methodology is based on the use of
WCOBRA/TRAC computer code. Sections 3 and 4 provide
an overview of code features, its assessment basis, and iden-
tiﬁed source of biases and uncertainties.
A key step in a best-estimate analysis is the assessment
of uncertainties associated with physical models, data un-
certainties, and plant initial and boundary condition vari-
abilities. As uncertainties are incorporated into the pro-
cess, a procedure is developed where the results from sev-
eral calculations are collected to develop a statement where
compliance with prescriptive rules or acceptance criteria is
demonstrated. Based on the current 10 CFR 50.46 rule, an
emergency core cooling system (ECCS) design is required2 Science and Technology of Nuclear Installations
to satisfy three main criteria: (1) the peak clad temperature
(PCT) should be less than 2200 F, (2) the local maximum
clad oxidation (LMO) should be less than 17%, and (3) the
core-wide oxidation (CWO) should be less than 1%. More
insights on the regulations and how industry satisﬁes those
rules in the framework of realistic calculations are provided
in Section 2.
The technique used to combine those uncertainties
evolved over the years. In its original implementation, West-
inghouse methodology followed strictly CASU where the use
of response surface was suggested as a practical means to
combinethevariousuncertaintycomponents.Morerecently,
themethodologywasmodiﬁedtowardnonparametricmeth-
ods.ThecurrentmethodologyiscalledAutomatedStatistical
Treatment of Uncertainty Method (ASTRUM) (Nissley, et al.
[12], Frepoli and Oriani [13]). The main diﬀerence between
the new and the old techniques is in the evaluation of ﬁnal
uncertainty,ElementIIIofCSAU.Acomparisonbetweenthe
two techniques is discussed by Muftuoglu et al. [8]. A review
of these techniques is given in Section 5 while sample results
are provided in Section 6.
2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND REVIEW
OF REGULATIONS
A large-break-LOCA event is categorized as a design-basis
accident. The current safety regulations of the United States
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (US NRC) are stipulated in
10 CFR Part 50, Section 50.46. Based on the 10 CFR 50.46
rule, an emergency core cooling system (ECCS) design is re-
quired to satisfy prescriptive criteria. The regulation identi-
ﬁes the following ﬁve criteria.
(1) Peak clad temperature (PCT) should be less than
2200F.
(2) Local maximum oxidation (LMO) should be less than
17%.
(3) Core-wide oxidation (CWO) should be less than 1%
(to limit the maximum amount of hydrogen gener-
ated).
(4) The core should maintain a coolable geometry.
(5) Long-term cooling should be demonstrated.
Typically, the last two criteria (coolable geometry and long-
term cooling) are satisﬁed outside the LOCA analysis once
the LOCA calculation demonstrate to be in compliance with
the ﬁrst three criteria.
The acceptance criteria above were established following
an extensive rulemaking in 1973. Also the regulation at that
timewasformulatedtoaccountofpotentiallyunknownphe-
nomena and recognizing lack of knowledge of fundamen-
tal physical phenomena. Several conservative “required fea-
tures” were mandated in Appendix K to 10 CFR 50. To cite
some, the decay heat was based on ANS 1971 model + 20%;
the metal-water reaction calculation was based on the con-
servative Baker-Just model; the heat transfer was limited to
steam only for low-ﬂooding rates; and so on.
This led to broad international development eﬀorts to
better understand LOCA phenomena and processes, in par-
ticular the large break LOCA. The eﬀort was both on the ex-
perimental side and analytical side (computer codes, evalua-
tion models). The major contributor to the development ef-
fort was the international 2D-3D program which focus on
multidimensional phenomena and scaling considerations.
The test facilities are full-scale upper plenum test facility
(UPTF); large-scale cylindrical core test facility (CCTF); slab
core test facility (SCTF).
The knowledge gained over the years led the industry
to consider a more realistic approach in the analysis of the
LOCA scenario (ECCS [14]). In 1988, the USNRC amended
its regulations (10 CFR 50.46) to allow the use of realistic
physical models (Federal Register [15]), simulated in com-
puter codes, to analyze the loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA)
in a PWR. In the amended rule, the acceptance criteria were
not changed (PCT = 2200 F, LMO = 17%, and CWO = 1%),
however certain physical models were identiﬁed as accept-
able but not prescribed. Acceptable data sources were identi-
ﬁed and documentation requirements speciﬁed (Regulatory
Guide 1.157). Any realistic calculation requires the assess-
mentoftheuncertainties.Overallrequirementsforquantify-
ing uncertainties were speciﬁed and the Code Scaling, Appli-
cability and Uncertainty (CSAU) method (Boyack et al. [1])
was cited CSAU as acceptable methodology framework. An
overview of the CSAU process is given in the next section.
2.1. Overviewofthecodescaling,applicabilityand
uncertainty(CSAU)roadmap
Ag r o u po fe x p e r t s( r e f e r r e dt oa st h et e c h n i c a lp r o g r a m
grouporTPG)underthesponsorshipoftheUSNuclearReg-
ulatoryCommission(USNRC)tookaneﬀorttodemonstrate
that practical methods could be developed which would be
acceptable under the new regulations. Shortly after its com-
pletion, the CSAU methodology and its demonstration were
described in a series of papers appearing in Nuclear Engi-
neering and Design (Boyack et al. [16, 17]).
The CSAU process is divided in three main elements. In
Element (1), the scenario is broken down into relevant-time
periods (e.g., blowdown, reﬁll, and reﬂood for large-break
scenario)andthenuclearpowerplantbrokendownintorele-
vantregions(e.g.,fuelrod,core,lowerplenum).Thenpoten-
tially important phenomena/processes are identiﬁed for each
time period and region. An expert’s panel performs ranking
and document basis for consensus. Results are compiled in
the phenomena identiﬁcation and ranking table (PIRT). The
PIRT is a critical element of CSAU-based methodologies. It
is designed to focusthe prioritization of code assessment and
facilitate the decisions on physical model and methodology
development.
Element (2) is the assessment of the code. An assess-
ment matrix is established where separate eﬀect tests (SETs)
and integral eﬀect tests (IETs) are selected to validate the
code against the important phenomena identiﬁed in the
PIRT. The code biases and uncertainties are established and
the eﬀect of scale determined. A key output from this ele-
mentistheestablishmentofprobabilitydistributionsandbi-
ases for the contributors identiﬁed in Element (1). In addi-
tion to the generation of probability distributions, and per-
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assessment of the code’s ability to correctly predict all the
dominant physical processes during the transient. This leads
to the adequacy decision of the evaluation model.
Element (3) is the actual implementation stage of the
methodology. Sensitivity and uncertainty analyses are per-
formed here. This element is probably the most straight for-
ward of all the elements. The dominant contributors and
their probability distributions are properly identiﬁed and
quantiﬁed, and if the computer code, through assessment
and comparison with data, is shown to accurately predict the
eﬀect of variations in input variables on the output result,
then several well-established methods are available to per-
formtheuncertaintypropagationstep.Thechoiceofmethod
isbasicallyapracticalone,controlledbytheexpenseincurred
in performing computer calculations. The methods utilized
evolved over the last two decades. An overview of the meth-
ods for combining the uncertainties is provided in Section 5.
T h eC S A Ui sap r a c t i c a lr o a d m a pt od e v e l o par e a l i s t i c
methodology but shortcomings were recognized since its in-
troduction.Inparticular,withregardtothePIRT,thehuman
judgment factor and the fact that knowledge gained is not
always factored back into ﬁnal documentation were seen as
a point of weakness. Soon after its introduction, the CSAU
methodology was reviewed by the technical community, and
comments were published in Nuclear Engineering and De-
sign (Hochreiter [18]). Although there was agreement that
the methodology described many of the key steps required
for an acceptable methodology, there was also technical crit-
icism and some skepticism on the practical applicability of
the methodology (Boyack et al. [17]).
One important issue raised was whether the PIRT pro-
cedure eliminated too many important processes from con-
sideration. This concern is heightened by the fact that since
everyadditionalprocesswhichisincludedincreasesthecom-
plexity andcostofsubsequentsteps,thereisthepossibility of
‘rationalizing’ a short list of contributors.
However, there are three conditions preventing such
an occurrence: First, detailed independent review of the
methodology by the USNRC’s experts eventually brings to
light important processes which may have initially been ig-
nored. Second, [19] provides a complete list of all the pro-
cesses known to aﬀect the LOCA transient, and requires a
detailed assessment of each one. Third, the CSAU method-
ology requires thorough assessment of a “frozen” version of
the computer code with a wide variety of experiments. Since
these experiments are speciﬁcally selected to cover the ex-
pected range of conditions, important phenomena will be
identiﬁed.
Overall, an important claim made by the TPG was that
themethodologywasstructured,traceable,andpracticaland
therefore it was ideally suited for application in the regu-
latory and design arenas. This was deﬁnitely demonstrated
by several successful implementations of the CSAU-based
methodologies currently licensed and applied to safety anal-
ysis in the industry.
Beginning in the mid 1980s, Westinghouse began de-
velopment of a best-estimate methodology, in partnership
with the Electric Power Research Institute and Consolidated
Edison (Calif, USA). Acceptance of the methodology was
achieved in 1996 after a rigorous review spanning over 3
years. A summary of the technical review and the conditions
of acceptance was issued by the USNRC (Jones and Liparulo
[20]). Many of the questions raised by the technical commu-
nity concerning the CSAU methodology were dealt with dur-
ing this review.
The PIRT concept has evolved over years (Wilson et al.
[21]a n dB o y a c ke ta l .[ 22]) and has been extensively used
in various areas by the industry. Main area of application
is the development of realistic analysis methodologies (not
limited to LOCA) and the development of testing require-
ments for new plant designs. Recent PIRT also includes the
“state of knowledge.” This process puts signiﬁcant emphasis
on processes or phenomena that are ﬂagged as highly impor-
tant with a low state of knowledge.
The CSAU was recently endorsed as an acceptable struc-
turedprocessintherecentlypublishedStandardReviewPlan
(NUREG-0800) [23] and Regulatory Guide 1.203 (2005)
[24]. In particular, RG 1.203 describes a structured evalua-
tion model development and assessment process (EMDAP)
which essentially follows the same principles of the CSAU
roadmap with more emphasis given to the evaluation model
development process which starts from the deﬁnition of the
objectives, the functional requirements, and the assessment
and leads to the evaluation model adequacy decision. The
EMDAP process is depicted in the ﬂowchart of Figure 1.
2.2. Regulationswithinastatisticalframework
While Elements (1) and (2) of the CSAU are generally ap-
plied in various form consistently with the original intent,
the techniques used to combine the uncertainties evolved
overthelastfewyears.TheCSAUoriginallysuggestedtheuse
of response surfaces methods, however shortcomings were
soon identiﬁed in early implementation. Direction in recent
years is toward direct Monte Carlo methods and the use of
nonparametric statistics. This generated a debate in the in-
dustry since the regulations are not directly suited to a sta-
tistical framework. A discussion on the interpretation of the
regulations from this perspective is presented in this section.
Thekeystepinarealisticanalysisistheassessmentofun-
certainties associated with physical models, data uncertain-
ties, and plant initial and boundary condition variabilities.
The issue is how results are interpreted to demonstrate com-
pliancewiththe10CFR50.46requirements.Asanadditional
requirement/clariﬁcation, 10 CFR 50.46 states that “[···]
uncertainty must be accounted for, so that, when the calculated
ECCS cooling performance is compared to the criteria set forth
in paragraph (b) of this section, there is a high level of proba-
bility that the criteria would not be exceeded.” Paragraph (b)
of 10 CFR 50.46 contains the list of the acceptance criteria.
10 CFR 50.46 does not explicitly specify how this probability
should be evaluated or what its value should be.
AdditionalclariﬁcationastotheUSNRCexpectationson
the acceptable implementation of the “high probability” re-
quirementisprovidedinSection 4ofRegulatoryGuide1.157
(Best-estimate Calculations of Emergency Core Cooling Sys-
tem Performance) that states “a9 5 % probability is considered
acceptable by the NRC staﬀ [···].”4 Science and Technology of Nuclear Installations
Element 1
Establish requirements for evaluation model capability
1. Specify analysis purpose, transient class and power plant class
2. Specify ﬁgures of merit
3. Identify systems, components, phases, geometries, ﬁelds and
processes that should be modeled
4. Identify and rank phenomena and processes
Element 2
Develop assessment base
5. Specify objectives for assessment base
6. Perform scaling analysis and identify
similarity criteria
8. Evaluate eﬀects of IET distortions and
SET scale up capability
7. Identify existing data and/or perform
IETs and SETs to complete data/base
9. Determine experimental uncertainties
Element 3
D e v e l o pe v a l u a t i o nm o d e l
10. Establish EM development plan
11. Establish EM structure
12. Develop or incorporate closure
models
Element 4
Assess evaluation model adequacy
Closure relations (bottom-up)
13. Determine model pedigree and applicability
to simulate physical processes
14. Prepare input and perform calculations
to assess model ﬁdelity and/or accuracy
15. Assess scalability of models
Integrated EM (top-down)
16. Determine capability of ﬁeld equations and
numeric solutions to represent processes and
phenomena
17. Determine applicability of EM to simulate
system components
18. Prepare input and perform calculations to
assess system interactions and global
capability
19. Assess scalability of integrated calculations
and data for distortions
20. Determine EM bases and uncertainties
Return to appropriate
elements, make and
assess corrections
No Yes Perform plant
event analyses
Adequacy decision
Does code meet
adequacy standard?
Figure 1: EMDAP (Reg. Guide 1.203).
The regulatory guide was not developed to the point of
explicitly considering a statistical approach to the uncertain-
ties treatment, which would also require a statement with re-
gard to the conﬁdence level associated with a statistical esti-
mate of the uncertainty. Regulatory Guide 1.157 introduced
the concept of conﬁdence level as a possible reﬁnement to
theuncertaintytreatment,butdidnotexpandfurtheronthis
concept.
As statistical methods are implemented to perform
LOCA safety analyses, a statistical statement based on a
95% conﬁdence level has been suggested by the NRC as
acceptable. This will be discussed further in Section 5.I nCesare Frepoli 5
practice, a 95% conﬁdence that the 95th percentile of PCT,
LMO, and CWO populations is within the speciﬁed accep-
tance criteria is considered acceptable by the USNRC to
demonstrate the required “high probability.” In particular
the safety evaluation report (SER) of the Westinghouse best-
estimate large break LOCA methodology (ASTRUM) states
thefollowing:“thestaﬀdeterminedthata95thpercentileprob-
abilitylevelbasedonbestapproximationsoftheconstituentpa-
rameter distributions and the statistical approach used in the
methodology is appropriately high.”
The main reason that a 95/95 statistical statement is ac-
cepted lies in the defense-in-depth philosophy. It is recog-
nized that many other layers of conservatisism are included
in any licensed realistic evaluation model. For example, the
following is stated by the NRC in ASTRUM SER:“Because
this application only applies to LBLOCA design basis analyses
(which assume a single failure), a higher probability [···]i s
not needed to assure a safe design.” Note that the single failure
assumption is not the only conservative bias/assumption in-
cludedintheWestinghousemethodology.Theuseofthisand
other conservative assumptions further supports the conclu-
sions that a 95/95 statistical statement is adequate to satisfy
the acceptance criteria, for the proposed evaluation model.
3. THE ENGINE OF W METHODOLOGY:
WCOBRA/TRAC COMPUTER CODE
Westinghouse large break LOCA evaluation model is based
on the use of the WCOBRA/TRAC thermal-hydraulic code,
the engine of the methodology. This code was developed
from COBRA/TRAC which was originally developed at Pa-
ciﬁc Northwest Laboratory (Thurgood et al. [25]) by com-
bining the COBRA-TF code (Thurgood et al. [26]) and the
TRAC-PD2 codes (Liles et al. [27]). The COBRA-TF code,
whichhasthecapabilitytomodelthree-dimensionalﬂowbe-
havior in a reactor vessel, was incorporated into TRAC-PD2
to replace its vessel model. TRAC-PD2 is a system-transient
codedesignedtomodelallmajorcomponentsintheprimary
system. Westinghouse continued the development and val-
idation of COBRA/TRAC through an extensive assessment
against several separate eﬀect tests (SETs) (Paik and Hochre-
iter [28]) and integral eﬀect tests (IETs).
The COBRA-TF (3D Module) is based on a two-ﬂuid,
three-ﬁeld representation of two-phase ﬂow. The three ﬁelds
are a vapor ﬁeld, a continuous liquid ﬁeld, and an entrained
liquid drop ﬁeld. Each ﬁeld in the vessel uses a set of three-
dimensional continuity, momentum, and energy equations
withoneexception:commonenergyequationisusedbyboth
the continuous liquid and the entrained liquid drop ﬁelds.
The one-dimensional components (TRAC-PD2) consist of
all the major components in the primary system, such as
pipes, pumps, valves, steam generators, and the pressurizer.
The one-dimensional components are represented by a two-
phase, ﬁve-equation, drift ﬂux model.
Among the new models and improvements incorporated
byWestinghouseare(1)improvedDFFB(dispersedﬂowﬁlm
boiling); (2) bottom/top downﬂooding (Reﬂood Entrain-
ment); accumulator nitrogen model; (3) a new core kinetic
model (point kinetic); (4) spacer grid model which includes
the heat transfer enhancement, drop breakup and grid rewet
eﬀects; (5) a two-ﬂuid choke ﬂow model based on TRAC-
PF1 formulation (Liles et al. [29]); (6) an improved fuel rod
model; (7) upgraded interfacial drag models.
The subchannel formulation included in the 3D module
(COBRA) oﬀers a large ﬂexibility from the modeling stand
point (Figure 2). The geometric complexity of the vessel in-
ternals and hardware can be modeled with great details with
a relative coarse hydraulic mesh. For example, important is
the capability of explicitly modeling the hot assembly within
the core.
Westinghouse followed the PIRT process to identify and
rank dominant phenomena. Important phenomena identi-
ﬁ e dw e r ea sf o l l o w s .
(1) Break ﬂow.
(2) Break path resistance.
(3) Initial stored energy/fuel rod.
(4) Core heat transfer.
(5) Delivery and bypass of ECCS water.
(6) Steam binding/entrainment.
(7) Condensation in cold leg and downcomer.
(8) Noncondensable gases/accumulator nitrogen eﬀects.
Note that several additional contributors not considered im-
portant in the CSAU demonstration were identiﬁed by West-
inghouse. Two examples are the eﬀect of the broken loop re-
sistances such as the pump and vessel nozzles on the core-
ow rate, and the eﬀect of fuel relocation after cladding burst
on local linear power. It was also found that it is impor-
tant to consider the eﬀect of variations in plant-operating
conditions such as the core power distribution and transient
peaking factors allowed by the technical speci cations for the
plant. In the CSAU demonstration, this aspect was not given
much attention.
For large break LOCA application, more than 100 tests
and 20 facilities were simulated by WCOBRA/TRAC. Quan-
tiﬁcations of model uncertainty such as heat transfer and
critical ﬂow were performed via SETs. IETs and large com-
ponent tests were used for judging the code’s ability to pre-
dict system responses. This includes the eﬀect of the noding.
In particular, PWR noding is consistent with noding used in
code assessment as much as in the practical part. Compen-
sating error analyses were performed to investigate the inter-
actionofvariousmodelsandidentifysituationswhereanap-
parently good prediction is due to oﬀsetting mispredictions.
Figure 3 shows the typical WCOBRA/TRAC vessel noding.
The inﬂuence of the user on the results has been rec-
ognized as another potential source of uncertainty (Aksan
et al. [30], Glaeser [31–33]). To eliminate such variability,
several engineering safeguards or procedures are considered
as part of the methodology. Calculation of plant-speciﬁc in-
puts and setup of initial and boundary conditions follow a
very prescriptive standard guidance which is formulated in
standard procedures. Frequent engineering and peer reviews
areimplementedtoassureadherencetothisguidance.Inthis
framework, plant-to-plant variations are limited as much
as in the practical part. Steady-state criteria are established
to minimize variability of initial conditions. Following this6 Science and Technology of Nuclear Installations
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procedures, consistency with the code assessment conclusion
is ensured and “user eﬀects” are virtually eliminated.
4. REVIEW BIASES AND UNCERTAINTIES
The Westinghouse methodology identiﬁed more than 30 im-
portant uncertainty contributors, as shown in Table 1.T h e
list in Table 1 applies to all the standard Westinghouse 2-,
3- and 4-loop PWR. For the 2-Loop UPI, some additional
uncertainty parameters were considered with regard to the
upper plenum hydraulics (Takeuchi et al. [5]).
Table 1 is a substantially larger than the list developed in
the CSAU demonstration. This fact does not indicate a aw in
the CSAU methodology itself, but is indicative of the need
to apply the PIRT process thoroughly, and not rely totally on
the CSAU demonstration.
Note also that there are many other parameters beyond
the list in Table 1 whichmayaﬀect the results. However these
are parameters whose sensitivity to the transient results is ex-
pected to be very small or negligible. In those circumstances,
it is appropriate to consider those parameters at their nom-
inal (expected or midpoint) value without consideration of
uncertainty. Typically,this is agoodapproximation whenthe
variation in the parameter is tightly controlled, such as pres-
surizer level, or when the sensitivity to the value of the pa-
rameterisknowntobenegligible,suchasasmalluncertainty
in the vessel and loop dimensions or secondary side liquid
mass.
For some other parameters, a conservative value may be
used when the parameter varies gradually as a function of
operating history, such as steam generator tube plugging, or
when the value of the parameter at the time of the accident is
indeterminate, such as location of the pressurizer relative to
the break. A parameter may also be bounded when the sen-
sitivity of the transient results of variations in the parameter
is small, such as moderator temperature coeﬃcient, or when
the eﬀort to develop and justify a detailed uncertainty treat-
ment was judged to exceed the beneﬁts of doing so, such as
containment pressure response.
The Westinghouse methodology considers the distinc-
tionbetweenglobalandlocalvariables.EachLOCAtransient
analysis is divided in two parts as follows.
(1) Predict the nominal behavior of fuel rods in the high
power fuel assembly, as a result of variations in global
variables. Global variables are deﬁned as those vari-
ableswhichaﬀecttheoverallsystemthermal-hydraulic
transient response. By nominal we mean the predicted
fuel behavior when local variables (see below) are at
their as-coded or best-estimate value.
(2) Foragivenreactor,coolantsystemresponse,andnom-
inal (see deﬁnition above) hot assembly behavior, pre-
dict the behavior of the hot rod as a result of variations
in local, or hot spot, variables. Local variables aﬀect
the hot spot response, but have a negligible eﬀect on
the overall system thermal hydraulics, which allows us
to consider their impact only at the local level.
Variables 24 to 37, for example, pertain to the second cate-
gory.
Most of the uncertainties in Table 1 with only few excep-
tions are explicitly treated and propagated during the uncer-
tainty analysis. The only exception is in the treatment of the
ECCS bypass and the entrainment into the steam generators
where the mild conservative bias observed during the code
assessment against full-scale data is accepted. Another exam-
ple of accepted conservative bias is the reﬂood heat transfer
coeﬃcient in the core during the initial insurge of water at
the end of reﬁll. The heat transfer is limited to a maximum
value during reﬂood due to the lack of data at high reﬂood
rates.
For each contributor in Table 1, the range over which the
variable was expected to deviate from the nominal (i.e., as
input or as coded value) was quantiﬁed using SETs and IETs
data or plant operation data. The end result is a probability
distribution function for each of the uncertainty parameters.
For the plant operating conditions, this quantiﬁcation was
relatively straightforward. For example, the average power in
the hot rod is constantly monitored during plant operation.
However, uncertainties are introduced by the measurement
and the software used in the control room to convert the raw
measurement to a linear heat rate. These uncertainties have
been thoroughly quantiﬁed by Westinghouse in actual reac-
tors.
For thermal-hydraulic models, the analysis was more dif-
ﬁcult. Each process has to be described in term of a single
modeling variable. For example, the ratio of the measured
to WCOBRA/TRAC predicted critical ﬂow rate (CD) is iden-
tiﬁed as the modeling variable to describe the ability of the
code to predict critical ﬂow. The uncertainty probability dis-
tribution function of the modeling variable (CD in this case)
is determined by generating a scatter plot obtained from the
simulation of several critical ﬂow experiments with WCO-
BRA/TRAC. Then, it had to be demonstrated that the model
used to simulate each speciﬁc process was suﬃciently correct
soasnottointroducesigniﬁcantbiasorscatterwhichdidnot
reﬂecttrueuncertainty.Thiswasrequiredbecausethescatter
plotusedtoquantifytheuncertaintymustnotbedominated.
For some parameters. the probability distribution func-
tions were approximated by normal distributions; for other
parameters, an “actual” distribution was used. In some cases,
a uniform distribution is assumed if the information was in-
suﬃcient to characterize a more appropriate distribution.
Note also that a detailed compensating error analysis was
performed to investigate the interaction of various models
and identify situations where an apparently good prediction
isduetooﬀsettingmispredictions.Theanalysiswasreviewed
by the NRC in order to assess the code’s ability to correctly
predict all the dominant physical processes during the tran-
sient.
5. REVIEW UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS METHODS:
FROM RESPONSE SURFACE TECHNIQUES TO
APPLICATION OF NONPARAMETRIC STATISTICS
Element (3) of the CSAU roadmap discusses how uncer-
tainties are combined and propagated throughout the tran-
sient. In Element (2), probability distribution functions have
been obtained for all uncertainty parameters (about 40 in8 Science and Technology of Nuclear Installations
Table 1: PWR uncertainty contributors.
(a) Plant initial uid conditions
1 RCS average uid temperature
2R C S p r e s s u r e
3 Accumulator uid temperature
4 Accumulator pressure
5 Accumulator volume
6 Safety injection temperature
7 Accumulator line resistance
(b) Plant initial core power distribution
8 Core power calorimetric uncertainty
9 Decay heat uncertainties
10 Gamma redistribution
11 Nominal hot assembly peaking factor
12 Nominal hot assembly average relative power
13 Average relative power, lower third of core
14 Average relative power, middle third of core
15 Average relative power, outer edge of core
16 Time in cycle
(c) Thermal-hydraulic physical models
17 Break type (cold leg split or guillotine)
18 Break area (for split breaks)
19 Critical ﬂow modeling (CD)
20 Broken loop resistance (pumps and other loop resistances)
21 Condensation modeling
22 ECC bypass entrainment and steam binding
23 Eﬀect of nitrogen injection
(d) Hot rod physical models
24 Local hot spot peaking factor
25 Fuel conductivity
26 Gap heat transfer coeﬃcient
27 Fuel conductivity after burst
28 Fuel density after burst (fuel relocation)
29 Cladding reaction rate
30 Rod internal pressure
31 Burst temperature
32 Burst strain
33 Blowdown heat-up heat transfer coeﬃcient
34 Blowdown cooling heat transfer coeﬃcient
35 Reﬁll heat transfer coeﬃcient
36 Reﬂood heat transfer coeﬃcient
37 Minimum ﬁlm boiling temperature
the Westinghouse methodology). The objective of the uncer-
tainty analysis is to quantify the contributions or better the
combined eﬀects of all uncertainties to the PCT (or LMO
and CWO) from the various sources. The exact solution of
the problem would require to examine all the possible inter-
actions among these parameters.
For example, let us assume a simple problem where
there are only two parameters X1 and X2. For each of
those parameters there are only three discrete value X1(1),
X1(2), and so forth. with a probability of occurrence asso-
ciated to each value, say P11, P12, and so forth. The ex-
act solution to the problem would require to develop an
event and outcomes table which include 9 possible events,
9 outcomes (9 PCT values). The resulting PCT distribu-
tion is obtained by arranging the 9 PCT values into bins
and developing a histogram. The 95th percentile (prob-
ability) PCT is obtained counting the number of occur-
rence in each bin until 95% of all occurrences have been
counted.
Clearly the problem is much more complicated than the
example. There are about 40 uncertainty parameters and a
continuous probability distribution function (PDF) is asso-
ciated to each parameter. This leads to an inﬁnite number of
possibilitiesandtheproblemcannotbesolvedexactlybutthe
solution needs to be approximated to a certain degree. Sev-
eral approaches have been proposed over the years and the
actual implementation of these methods in the industrial ap-
plicationevolvedoverthelastdecade.Anoverviewofvarious
methods is provided in the next sections.
5.1. Responsesurfacemethod
A response surface method was suggested by the TGP in an
eﬀort to demonstrate that practical methods could be de-
veloped within the CSAU framework which would be ac-
ceptable by the NRC. Data points are generated by running
the code with speciﬁc input variables to perform parametric
studies on selected uncertainty contributors. Then response
surfaces are ﬁt calculation to these data points. The response
surfaces are treated as a “surrogate” of the code which re-
ﬂects the functionality between PCT and the uncertainty at-
tributes. Finally, these response surfaces are used in a Monte
Carlo simulation to generate the output distribution (PCT
PDF, e.g.).
An advantage of this approach is that the generation of
response surfacesrequires a well organized matrix of calcula-
tionsinwhichsingleandmultipleeﬀectsareevaluated.These
calculationsallowtheanalysttounderstandhoweachimpor-
tant contributor aﬀects the PCT.
On the other hand, the actual implementation is not
as straightforward. The uncertainty contributors have to be
grouped together to limit the size of the run matrix which is
a strong function of the number of parameters ranged in the
uncertainty analysis. At the same time, it is important to en-
sure that the run matrix or matrices can adequately highlight
key interactions.
The ﬁrst Westinghouse realistic LOCA methodology
(Young et al., 1998 [3]) was based on the use of response
surfaces. A list of assumptions was made to solve the prob-
lem and they are highlighted in the following. The ﬁrst main
assumption was to divide the problem into two parts.
(1) Predict the overall reactor response and the nominal
thermal-hydrauliccondition in the high power fuel as-
sembly, as a result of variations in “global” variables.
By nominal we refer to the predicted fuel behavior
when the local variables (24–37 in Table 1) are set at
their as coded “best-estimate” values.Cesare Frepoli 9
(2) For a given reactor response and nominal hot assem-
bly condition, predict the probability distribution of
the hot rod behavior as a result of variations in “local”
variables.
Step (1) is based on WCOBRA/TRAC simulation while
step (2) is based on local evaluation performance with a
one-dimensional conduction code called HOTSPOT. For
each WCOBRA/TRAC run, the eﬀect of the local uncertain-
ties is collapsed to a probability distribution by perform-
ing a large number (1000) of repeated cladding temperature
(HOTSPOT) calculations or trials in which the diﬀerent val-
uesofthelocalvariablesarerandomlysampledfromtheirre-
spective distributions like in a Monte Carlo simulation. The
process is depicted in Figure 4.
It is noted that the HOTSPOT probability distribution is
afunctionofthePCT.Forexample,anuncertaintyontheox-
idation reaction will have more eﬀect if the clad temperature
is high. In other words, the probability distribution is a func-
tion of the “global” thermal hydraulic response. The “local”
probability distribution is therefore a conditional probability
on the “global” outcome probability.
The segregation of some of the variables into the “local”
categoryreducestheproblem somewhat,buttheruns matrix
requiredtoresolvetheeﬀectoftheremainingglobalvariables
would still be too large.
The second main assumption was that the global parame-
ters can be divided in groups. PCT contributions from each
group are assumed independent and can be superimposed.
The groups identiﬁed were as follows.
(1) Initial condition variables (1–7).
(2) Initial core power distribution (8–16).
(3) Physical model and processes parameters (17–23).
The variables are grouped with the justiﬁcation that some
interactions between variables are more important than oth-
ers. In particular, interactions between variables in diﬀerent
groups (e.g., the ﬂuid average temperature in Group (1) and
the nominal hot assembly peaking factor in Group (2) are
considered second-order relative to the interaction within
group.
Within each group, some of the parameters were then
statistically combined into others as “augmentation” fac-
tors and some were simply bounded and removed from
the uncertainty analysis. The uncertainty of some other pa-
rameters were statistically “collapsed.” For example, it was
shown that the contribution of the initial condition vari-
ables could be combined in a single normal distribution
(third main assumption). At the end of this process, it
was shown that the required WCOBRA/TRAC run matrix
contains
(1) 10 initial conditions runs;
(2) 15 power distribution runs;
(3) 14 global model runs;
(4) 3-4 split break runs to determine limiting break area;
(5) 8 additional superposition runs.
The last 8 runs were added to correct for the superposition
assumption (second assumption). The run matrix of the ad-
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Figure 4: Relationship of local hot spot distribution to global pre-
diction.
ditional “superposition step” is deﬁned by combining dif-
ferent values of initial conditions, power distributions, and
global models. A bias line is determined based on linear re-
gression from the results of the superposition runs. The bias
linecorrelatesthePCTS obtainedfromthesuperpositionand
the PCTL predicted from the response surfaces and assuming
the linear superposition for a given set of parameters. The
end results are an additional PCT penalty which is intended
to bound the eﬀect of the nonlinear behavior.
With all these assumptions, the problem is reduced to a
manageable size with a run matrix of the order of 50 WCO-
BRA/TRAC simulations.
A criticism on the use of response surfaces is that poly-
nomials could not pick up discontinuities in results or prop-
erly identify cliﬀ eﬀects or bifurcations in the results. On the
other hand, experience conﬁrms that, at least for large break
LOCA, the output is well behaved over a wide range of input
values and the response surface seems ideally suited for cap-
turing the local maxima which can occur over the range of
variation.
5.2. DirectMonteCarlomethod
The problem could be solved (approximated) with a direct
Monte Carlo method. The implementation of the method is
straightforward and it simply requires to sample the input
distributions n times, then use the computer code directly to
generate n outputs which are used to estimate the actual dis-
tribution. The issue is to deﬁne how many runs are required
to accurately deﬁne the distribution of the outcome (PCT,
e.g.).
Several years ago, this approach was considered totally
impractical due to the number of calculations involved (in
the order of thousands). This may not be true today, how-
ever. While there are still several issues to resolve with this10 Science and Technology of Nuclear Installations
approach, particularly the number of calculations required
to adequately represent the output distribution and extract
knowledge about the importance and eﬀect of each contrib-
utor, this approach can be considered today.
5.3. Data-basedcodeuncertaintymethod
A third approach for estimating uncertainty in the PCT pre-
diction due to uncertainties in the thermal-hydraulic models
is to compare the computer code to many tests which simu-
late conditions in a PWR, which result in a measured PCT.
Note that this step was also taken in the CSAU demonstra-
tion, but the results were not used directly.
The code bias and uncertainty are then determined di-
rectly from a PCT scatter plot. The advantage of this ap-
proachis thatit eﬀectivelyencompassesallpotential contrib-
utors to uncertainty. The disadvantages are that the individ-
ual contributors cannot be separated, and the propagation of
the dominant contributors at full scale is not adequately rep-
resented in the data base (e.g., most tests producing a PCT
are single eﬀect tests which do not combine the eﬀects of
blowdown and reﬂood).
5.4. Nonparametricstatisticsmethod
These methods derive from direct Monte Carlo meth-
ods. However, instead of attempting to obtain information
with regard to underneath probability distribution func-
tion (PDF) of the measure (say PCT), the PDF is ignored
(distribution-free) and nonparametric statistics is used to
determine a bounding value of the population with a given
conﬁdence level.
These alternative methods have been proposed in recent
years and started to be applied in realistic calculations of
LOCA/ECCS analysis (Wickett Eds et al. [34]). Although,
there are some conceptual similarities, most of these meth-
ods, started to be employed in Europe in the late 90s (Glaeser
et al. [31–33]).
More recently in the US, both AREVA-NP (in 2003)
(Martin and O’Dell [35]) and Westinghouse (in 2004) (Niss-
ley et al. [12]) have developed NRC-licensed best-estimate
LOCA evaluation models based on the use of these methods.
Other applications in the industry are the extended statisti-
cal method (ESM) by AREVA/EDF in France (Sauvage and
Keldenich [36]) and the GE application to non-LOCA events
(Bolger et al. [37]). While all of these implementations uti-
lized essentially the same technique to combine the uncer-
tainties, there are fundamental diﬀerences with regard to the
interpretationofhowthesecalculationresultsareusedtosat-
isfy the regulatory acceptance criteria.
The nonparametric statistical sampling technique is
sometimes referred to as “distribution-free.” It is possible to
determine the tolerance limits from unknown distributions
by randomly sampling the character in question. The con-
sideration of nonparametric tolerance limits was originally
presented by Wilks [38]. Wilks study showed that the pro-
portion of the population between two order statistics from
a random sample is independent of the population sampled,
it is only a function of the particular order statistics chosen.
Using the well-known Wilks formula, one can determine the
sample size for a desired population proportion at a given
tolerance interval. Let us say that we are interested in deter-
mining a bounding value of the peak clad temperature (95th
percentile (γ = 0.95)) with 95% conﬁdence level (β = 0.95).
Thesamplesize(i.e.,thenumberofcomputerrunsrequired)
is determined solving the following equation:
β = (1 −γ)
N (1)
By substituting γ = 0.95 and β = 0.95, the number of com-
puter runs, N is found to be 59. In this technique, all the
uncertainty parameters are sampled simultaneously in each
run similarly to the direct Monte Carlo method discussed in
Section 5.2. The method is essentially a crude Monte Carlo
simulation used with the minimum trial number to stabilize
the “estimator.”
Results are then ranked from highest PCT to lowest, rank
1 provides a bounding estimate of the 95th percentile PCT
with 95% conﬁdence level.
Beside the PCT, the 10 CFR 50.46 acceptance criteria to
be satisﬁed include also the estimated local maximum clad
oxidation (LMO), which needs to be less than 17%, and the
estimated value of core wide oxidation (CWO), which needs
to be less than 1%.
A rigorous interpretation of the regulations would re-
quire the formulation of a simple singular statement of un-
certainty in the form of a tolerance interval for the numerical
acceptance criteria of the three attributes contained in the 10
CFR 50.46 (PCT, LMO, and CWO). The singular statement
of uncertainty chosen in this case would be based on a 95%
tolerance interval with a 95% conﬁdence level for each of the
10 CFR 50.46 criteria, that is, PCT, LMO, and CWO.
According to Guba et al. [39], this required the exten-
sion of the sample size beyond the 59 runs which are only
suﬃcient if one outcome is measured from the sample. A
more general theory, which applies to the case where more
thanoneoutcomeisconsideredfromthesample,isdiscussed
in Guba 2003 paper which provides a more general formula
applicable to one-sided populations with multiple outcomes
(P > 1). The number of runs can be found solving the fol-
lowing equation for N:
β =
N−p 
j=0
N!
(N − j)!j!
γj(1 − γ)
N−j. (2)
By substituting γ = 0.95 and β = 0.95, and p = 3, the num-
ber of computer runs, N is found equal to 124. This method
was recently implemented in the Westinghouse realistic large
break LOCA evaluation model, also referred to as “Auto-
mated Statistical TReatment of Uncertainty Method” (AS-
TRUM)(Nissleyetal.[12]).TheASTRUMevaluationmodel
and its approach to the treatment of uncertainties were ap-
proved by the US NRC in November 2004.
The implementation or interpretation of order statistics
in safety analysis is not fully consistent within the industry.
This has led to an extensive public debate among regulators
and researchers which can be found in the open literature
(Makai and P´ al [40], Wallis et al. [41–43], Orechwa [44, 45]Cesare Frepoli 11
and Nutt and Wallis [46] ) .T h ef o c u so ft h i sd e b a t eh a sb e e n
mostly on the minimum number of runs (sample size) re-
quired to satisfy the LOCA licensing criteria (10 CFR 50.46).
Westinghouse strategy was to take the most generic and
robust approach to the issue and minimize licensing risks to
its customers. Westinghouse position is that there are three
criteria that need to be satisﬁed simultaneously with a sin-
gular statistical statement in the form of 95/95. Further, no
assumption is made with regard to degree of correlation be-
tween the three parameters (PCT, LMO, and CWO) which
are measured against the criteria. Based on these assump-
tions, the sample size is obtained from the Guba and Makai
equations (2) and results in 124 calculations.
The maximum values for PCT, LMO, and CWO are ex-
tracted from the sample and used as bounding estimators of
the 95th percentile for all three quantities with 95% conﬁ-
dence level. The correct interpretation of the results thus ob-
tained is as follows: there is at least a 95% conﬁdence that the
limiting PCT, LMO, and CWO from the sample exceed the
“true” 95th percentile).
In general, this approach has been considered (overly)
conservative, and various authors have suggested that a re-
duced number of runs would be suﬃcient compared to
what is considered in the Westinghouse methodology. For
instance, another approach assumes that while nothing is
known relative to the output variable PDF, a strong corre-
lation may exist between the output variables. For example,
typically the local maximum oxidation is a strong function
of the PCT. However, this approach may require that such a
correlation being demonstrated and quantiﬁed for the spe-
ciﬁc analysis.
Both methods are considered acceptable, and each
presents advantages and disadvantages. Westinghouse feels
that the use of the most generic and robust approach sim-
pliﬁes the licensing and approval process, without requiring
plant speciﬁc veriﬁcations relative to the degree of correla-
tion between the variables or the dominant nature of one of
the three criteria. Additionally oxidation is a function of clad
temperature and associated time history, not merely of peak
cladding temperature. Westinghouse analysis has shown that
while a high degree of correlation between PCT and LMO
exists, this is plant speciﬁc and a generic statement of perfect
correlation can not be supported.
An alternative approach was outlined in recent papers
fromWallis[43].Wallisconcludedthatnomatterwhat,there
is only one “output” of interest from a safety analysis, and
that is whether the regulatory criteria that apply to the spe-
ciﬁc transient under consideration are veriﬁed. Considering
the application to a LOCA analysis, the question that Wal-
lis therefore wants to address is “how many computer code
runs are necessary to guarantee, at a 95% conﬁdence, that
there is a 95% probability that a LOCA will result in a PCT <
2200F, an LMO < 17%, and CWO < 1 % ? ”T h eW a l l i sa n s w e r
is that if 59 runs are performed, all resulting in an accept-
able result (i.e., PCT < 2200F, an LMO < 17%, and CWO
< 1%), then a positive answer to the above question can be
provided.
The Wallis approach combines PCT, LMO, and CWO
into a “single output.” The criteria evaluation process is ab-
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Figure 5: Wallis Formulation.
sorbed into the “black box” and simply gives a binary output
if succeeded or failed to pass the requirement (compliance
with the ECCS design acceptance criteria). Wallis answers a
simple “logical” question as depicted in Figure 5 which was
extracted directly from his paper (Wallis [43]).
Wallis’s answer is correct in the context of the question
as posed, but has in our opinion some limitation in the real
application of the method to nuclear safety. In particular, the
sample size (number of runs) derived following Wallis’s for-
mulation is not suﬃcient to make a singular statement (at
95/95 level) on the margin that is actually available in the
plant design for each of the three criteria. In fact, while there
is a 95% conﬁdence that the 95th PCT, LMO, and CWO
would be lower than the regulatory limits, the analyst can-
not make an estimation (at a 95% conﬁdence level) on how
much margin is actually available with respect to the three
criteria considered, without decreasing the conﬁdence level
or recurring to argumentations based on the correlation be-
tween oxidation and PCT.
The quantiﬁcation and tracking of the margin is most of-
ten requested by both the plant operator and the regulator,
and the Westinghouse approach (ASTRUM) was sensitive to
this issue. More speciﬁcally, tracking of PCT margin is a reg-
ulatoryrequirementof10CFR50.46andcannotbewellsup-
ported without a quantiﬁcation of the margin available from
the analysis of record.
Further insights on the robustness of the statistical
method employed in the current Westinghouse realistic large
breakLOCAmethodology (ASTRUM)areprovidedin apre-
vious paper (Frepoli and Oriani [13]).
As far as the actual implementation is concerned, AS-
TRUM evaluation model was grandfathered to the original
methodology which was approved in 1996. The extension
mainly focused on replacing the method which is used to
combine the uncertainties, from the response surface tech-
nique to a direct Monte Carlo sampling method. The code
(WCOBRA/TRAC) was essen tially unchanged and more the
uncertainty parameters were retained with the original prob-
ability distribution functions.
One main advantage of ASTRUM is that the number
of runs (sample size) is ﬁxed (124 runs) and it is indepen-
dent on the number of uncertainty attributes considered
in the sampling process. As a result, few additional uncer-
tainty parameters were directly sampled instead of choosing12 Science and Technology of Nuclear Installations
the bounding approach considered in the 1996 version of
the methodology. To mention some of these new parame-
ters sampled in the procedure: (1) time in cycle on which the
postulated LOCA event is predicted to occur; (2) break type
(a double ended guillotine or a split); (3) break size for a split
break.
The distinction between local and global variables devel-
oped in the 1996 version of the methodology was retained in
ASTRUM for convenience. However in ASTRUM only a sin-
gle HOTSPOT calculation is executed downstream a WCO-
BRA/TRAC, instead of 1000 HOTSPOT runs as in the 1996
methodology. The HOTSPOT calculation is now a single cal-
culation where the local uncertainties coeﬃcients are set at
their biased values as selected by random sampling from
their respective distributions. This procedure is required to
be consistent with the Monte Carlo approach, where a ran-
dom single-value uncertainty parameter is randomly sam-
pled from the respective distributions for each simulation,
which is composed by a WCOBRA/TRAC and a HOTSPOT
calculation. There is no need to obtain the “local distribu-
tion” depicted in Figure 4 in this case, but simply a random
local case within that local distribution, one for each WCO-
BRA/TRAC run.
6. SAMPLE ANALYSIS RESULTS
Since its original approval in 1996, Westinghouse best-
estimate large break LOCA methodology has been applied
to perform safety analysis for several PWRs both in the USA
and outside. Currently in the US, 24 plants are licensed or
analyzed with Westinghouse 1996 and 1999 (upper plenum
injection) methodologies and more than 10 plants have been
analyzed with the most recent ASTRUM evaluation model
which was approved by the NRC in late 2004.
A best-estimate LOCA safety analysis is an engineering
project which encompasses several activities. A ﬂow chart is
illustrated in Figure 6. Data is collected and compiled in an
input model which describes the plant. ASTRUM represents
the central phase where uncertainties are combined as dis-
cussed in Section 5.4.
Sample ASTRUM analysis results are presented for a typ-
ical Westinghouse 3-loop PWR. Other results can be found
in the literature (Frepoli [7, 9–11]).
Results for a typical 3-Loop PWR are shown in Figure 7.
Figure 7isascatterplotwhichshowstheeﬀectoftheeﬀective
break area on the ﬁnal PCT. The eﬀective break area is de-
ﬁned by multiplying the discharge coeﬃcient (CD) with the
sample value of the break area (FA), normalized to the cold
leg cross sectional area. Note that the break area is ranged
only for the split breaks (SPLIT), whereas CD is ranged for
both split and double-ended-guillotine-cold-leg (DEGCL)
breaks. This creates a region in the FAxCD space where both
t y p e so fb r e a kc a nb ef o u n d .
Figure 7 shows that the limiting PCT case is a double-
ended-guillotine-cold-leg break transient with a near nomi-
nal discharge coeﬃcient CD. It is noted that the limiting case
with respect to local maximum oxidation (LMO) has rank 2
intermsofPCTandisSPLITcasewithalowereﬀectivebreak
area.TheLMOcasecanbeeasilyspottedinthescatteredplot
Table 2: Sample results of various BELOCA analyses. (Comparison
between the 1996 EM and 2004 ASTRUM EM)
Representative
plant analysis 1996 EM CQD 2004 EM ASTRUM
2-loop with UPI PCT = 2087◦FL M O<
17% CWO < 1%
PCT = 1870◦FL M O=
3.4% CWO   0.3%
(18% Power Uprate)
3-loop PCT = 2050◦FL M O=
12% CWO = 0.8%
PCT = 1836◦FL M O=
2.9% CWO = 0.03%
4-loop PCT = 2125◦FL M O=
13% CWO = 0.9%
PCT = 1967◦FL M O=
2.4% CWO   0.4%
ofFigure 7,sincethePCTisrelativelyhigherthanothercases
with similar value of eﬀective break area.
Figure 8 shows the degree of correlation between the lo-
cal maximum oxidation and PCT for the various runs. While
the correlation degree is high, the ﬁgure shows that the max-
imum LMO case does not necessarily coincide with the max-
imum PCT case.
Figure 9showsthecladtemperaturefortherankedtop10
PCT cases. The limiting PCT case and LMO cases are shown
in red and green, respectively. It is noted that LMO case is
reached in transient which was aﬀected by delay quench. Al-
though the peak clad temperature is lower than the limiting
PCT case, more oxidation was occurred in the second case as
high temperature were sustained for a longer period of time.
The limiting case in term of core-wide oxidation (CWO) had
rank 12 in terms of PCT.
Since the limiting PCT, LMO, and CWO values from the
run matrix (124 cases) were below the 10 CFR 50.46 limits, a
statement can be made were 95th percentile PCT, LMO, and
CWO populations are bounded by the limiting values with a
95% conﬁdence level.
Other sample results obtained with both the 1996
methodology (response surfaces) and 2004 ASTRUM (non-
parametric) are shown in Table 2. Note that for similar plant
ASTRUM provided at least 150 F in additional PCT margin
and signiﬁcant more margins in term of oxidation.
7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Since the 1988 amendment of the 10 CFR 50.46 rule which
allowedtheuseofrealisticphysicalmodelstoanalyzeloss-of-
coolant accidents (LOCA), Westinghouse has been continu-
ously developing and applying its realistic LOCA methodol-
ogyforthepurposeofsafetyanalysisinnuclearpowerplants.
The ﬁrst version methodology was approved by the NRC in
1996 after an extensive review by the NRC and ACRS.
An overview of the methodology, starting from the
thermal-hydraulic code WCOBRA/TRAC and the develop-
ment of its biases and uncertainties was provided. The pa-
per illustrated that a key step in any best-estimate or real-
istic analysis is the process selected to combine those un-
certainties. Nonparametric order statistics is now the chosen
technique to address the issue across the industry. However,
the implementation or interpretation of statistics in safety
analysis is still not fully consistent within the industry, inCesare Frepoli 13
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Figure 6: Flow chart of a typical BELOCA analysis.
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Figure 7: Peak clad temperature (PCT) from the ASTRUM 124 run
set.
particular with regard to how the analysis satisﬁes the accep-
tance criteria set by the regulatory body (i.e., 10 CFR 50.46).
The Westinghouse NRC-approved method (ASTRUM)
chooses to follow a rigorous implementation of the order
statistics theory, which leads to the execution of 124 sim-
ulations within a large break LOCA analysis. This is a fun-
damentally sound approach which guarantees that a bound-
ing value (at 95% probability) of the 95th percentile for each
of the three 10 CFR 50.46 ECCS design acceptance criteria
(PCT, LMO and CWO) is obtained. A 95/95 statistical state-
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Figure 8: Oxidation and PCT from the ASTRUM 124 run set.
ment on three main ECCS design criteria (10 CFR 50.46) is
acceptable by the NRC.
In general, the successful approval of the methodology
and several applications to the safety analysis of operating
plants that followed is an evidence that the CSAU is indeed a
workable roadmap for the development and implementation
of realistic methods for safety analysis within the boundaries
of the current regulatory environment. Some criticism is still
present in the scientiﬁc community with regard to CSAU-
based methodologies. In particular, concerns with regard to14 Science and Technology of Nuclear Installations
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Figure 9: Clad temperature traces at the PCT elevation for the top
10 ranked PCT cases in the ASTRUM 124 run set.
the degree of “engineering judgment” within the process are
expressed. However a realistic methodology really represents
the current state-of-knowledge and the CSAU; and PIRT is
a systematic process that allows setting priorities and focus
on the most important areas for the purpose of safety anal-
yses. Layers of realistic conservatisism are often added to in-
crease the robustness of the method. Review the methodol-
ogy by the regulatory bodies, look at the evaluation model
in its entirety, and extend well beyond the boundary of what
is predicated by the PIRT process. As more information be-
comes available, information can be used to reﬁne the mod-
els. Further improvements typically result in “uncovering”
hidden safety margin which may be utilized to improve plant
operation performances and economics. Such process pre-
vents technology from being “frozen” in a highly regulated
environment and it is in line with risk-informed regulation
and defense-in-depth philosophy.
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